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Japanese Americans

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Although Asian Americans may share similar geographic origins and social experiences in the United States, closer analyses of the socio-historical experiences of each group—and its members—indicate the multiplicity of the umbrella category, Asian American. As noted thus far in this book, though the history of immigration from Asian nations dates back to the early nineteenth century, most immigrants from Asian countries began arriving to the United States in masses after 1965, when restrictive immigration policies were abolished. As such, Asian Americans as a whole are frequently perceived as relatively new immigrants, with disproportionately large numbers of foreign-born members in their communities. However, Japanese Americans have a history of immigration to the United States significantly different from other Asian groups.

Three major waves of immigration from Japan to the United States took place between the 1880s and the 1960s, and the prevalence of Japanese immigration to the United States has diminished since then. Reflecting this history, Japanese Americans are more similar to Jewish, Italian, and other white ethnic groups than to other Asian

ethnic groups in that a large majority of them are third- or higher-generation Americans with conspicuous evidence of assimilation. Yet, not being white, Japanese Americans continue to face discrimination in American society and are not allowed to fully merge into the mainstream American society. Among the oldest immigrant groups, Japanese American communities have weathered phases of challenges and transformations; many of such experiences are reflective of the economic and sociopolitical trends in both Japan and the United States. In this chapter, the past and present trajectories Japanese Americans have embarked upon will be discussed, and informed speculations will be made about their future directions.

TRENDS OF EARLY JAPANESE IMMIGRATION

The early history of Japanese immigration to the United States includes three distinct waves, each with unique historical significance in understanding American, Japanese, and Japanese American sociopolitical circumstances. Reflective of such situational fluctuations, each wave of

immigrants was dominated by a particular group. The general historical trends in Japanese immigration to the United States are discussed in the following sections.

The First Wave: Male Laborers (1885–1908)

As the *Edo Shougunate* ended Japan's self-imposed national isolation in 1866, only dribbles of Japanese citizens moved or even traveled abroad, and then usually as servants accompanying Westerners with business ties to Japan. For instance, an American merchant, Eugene van Reed—who conducted business near Tokyo—sent about 140 Japanese farmers to work on sugar plantations in Hawaii in 1868 (Tamura, 1999). Also, John H. Schnell, a Dutch merchant, established the famous Wakamatsu Colony in 1869, when he brought an initial group of 20 or so Japanese workers to a tea and silk farm in California. Incidentally, these locations, Hawaii and California, later became major hubs of Japanese American communities. While these destinations represented a great deal of geographic and cultural disparities, the initial clusters of Japanese migrants to these two locations shared some commonalities. For instance, they consisted primarily of male workers seeking labor opportunities overseas with the intention of returning home after achieving financial prosperity. In addition, these laborers typically faced harsh living and working conditions once they were brought overseas, and the financial gains were frequently far smaller than they had been promised (van Sant & Daniels, 2000).

Soon came more structured clusters of migration to the United States. This emergence of mass migration to the United States was fueled by the severe economic conditions across Japan in the early 1880s, which forced the *Meiji* government to relax the restrictions placed on laborers going overseas. At the same time, the Hawaiian sugar plantations were in a dire need of workers, as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 had abruptly stopped the flow of laborers from China. In 1885, a

U.S. representative, Robert Irwin, successfully negotiated with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Kaoru Inoue, to send approximately 2,000 Japanese workers to Hawaiian sugar plantations under a government-sponsored labor migration program. This agreement stipulated that representatives of the Hawaiian government would conduct a series of recruitment sessions across Japan, soliciting Japanese workers to sign 3-year contracts for employment on those sugar plantations (Maruyama, 1985). Under this agreement, approximately 30,000 workers went to Hawaii; in less than a decade, in 1894, however, the *Meiji* government terminated its agreement, ending the government-sponsored labor migration programs to Hawaii. Yet, laborers continued to seek employment opportunities in the United States outside of such programs (Fujioka, 1927; Sims, 2001).

Women laborers were actively recruited to move to Hawaii in the 1885 Irwin-Inoue negotiation, for wages one-third lower than their male counterparts; however, such effort was not evident in migration to the mainland. This difference can be attributed to the policies of the local governments: while the Hawaiian government encouraged familywide migration, the California government did not welcome Japanese families, as they did not wish the Japanese population to grow (see chapter 2 for further information). Many of the Japanese Americans in Hawaii, thus, were families, usually with wives supplementing their family income by working not only on plantations, but also in service and manufacturing industries. In fact, it is documented that *Issei* women, or foreign-born Japanese women, made up the majority of the Hawaiian female labor force in the 1890s, as they typically entered the workforce alongside their husbands (Saiki, 1985).

By contrast, an overwhelming majority of the early Japanese migrants to the mainland were single males or men who had left their wives behind in Japan. Ichioka (1988) states that these men moved from Japan to the mainland typically as students or laborers—oftentimes both. While full-time Japanese students were not necessarily

concentrated in particular geographic areas, the laborers and student laborers were heavily concentrated in the western states, such as California, Washington, and Oregon (Tamura, 1984). Among the first to seek migration to the U.S. mainland from Japan in the *Meiji* era were male students, who represented three distinct groups. One consisted of a small number of elite students with full scholarships to attend prestigious American universities, frequently on the East Coast (e.g., Massachusetts and Rhode Island), where these men were prepared for prominent positions in the Japanese government and other agencies. Another group represented a similarly small number of young men from wealthy families, who privately funded their education to attend American universities, again typically on the East Coast. Most of these students, too, returned to Japan upon completion of their education, and in fact many became influential figures in Japan.

The third group of students differed dramatically from the preceding two in the circumstances of their arrival, and they greatly contributed to the subsequent establishment of the Japanese American communities in the United States. This large group of students included ambitious young men who wished to study in the United States but were unable to secure sufficient funds for their schooling and travel. These aspiring students tried to realize their dreams by seeking employment in the United States, hoping to attend school part-time. Despite their lack of financial and social capital, these student laborers represented a prominent force in the history of early Japanese migration to mainland United States. In 1888, Yukio Ozaki, a Japanese journalist who had previously served as a government official, reported that about 80% of the Japanese population in San Francisco, totaling approximately 2,000, consisted of these student laborers (Ichioka, 1988). While some of them had come to the United States in an attempt to avoid being drafted by the Japanese military, most had been motivated by the prospect of improving themselves and their home county through an education in a more modern,

democratic society. Many of them worked as domestic servants, while others were employed as menial laborers in various industries, including farming and fishing. San Francisco and other western regions, such as Los Angeles and Seattle, were popular destinations for these students due to their relative proximity to Japan (Stearns, 1974).

These Japanese student laborers, like their non-student laborer counterparts in San Francisco, did not initially intend to permanently reside in the United States, and many student laborers in fact returned to Japan. Others, however, remained in the United States for much longer periods, realizing that their educational and financial dreams might be difficult to accomplish in a short period. Thus, the contributions made by these student laborers toward the growth of Japanese American communities—as well as the American economy—were notable.

The Second Wave: Picture Brides (1908–1924)

In order to better understand the experiences of Japanese American laborers, it is important to note that the anti-Asian sentiment in California had already been heightened when they began to arrive there in the 1880s. The Chinese had arrived on the West Coast in the mid-1800s during the Gold Rush (Norton, 1924). They rapidly expanded their labor presence there, primarily because they were willing to work diligently in harsh working conditions for lower wages than were their white American counterparts. White laborers and white trade organizations considered the presence of the ostensibly docile and hard-working Chinese laborers in the mainland United States a major threat to their economic interest and financial security. This tension greatly exacerbated the social position of the workers of Chinese heritage, and white Americans grew extremely prejudiced against them—while, on the other hand, continuing to exploit the labor power of the low-wage Chinese workers. The Chinese and the Japanese, despite many crucial differences, were indistinguishable to most white Americans; hence, the preexisting resentment toward Chinese

laborers was quickly generalized to the Japanese Americans in the mainland U.S.

In response to the enormous pressure of anti-Japanese political movements on the West Coast, the Japanese government agreed to sign the Gentlemen's Agreement with the U.S. government between 1907 and 1908, consenting not to issue passports for workers wishing to seek employment in the United States. This agreement, nevertheless, allowed Japanese laborers already residing in the United States to travel between the two countries and invite their spouses and children to enter the U.S. As such, it did not end all Japanese entry into the United States (Spickard, 1997).

As the Japanese American population in the mainland consisted largely of male laborers at the time, as discussed thus far, it is not surprising that women over the age of 15 only accounted for 4% of the approximately 25,000 Japanese Americans in the 1900 Census (Glenn, 1986). In addition, most of these women were in Hawaii, as noted earlier. Although many Japanese laborers remigrated from Hawaii to the mainland U.S., Japanese women were practically absent in the mainland U.S. In addition, antimiscegenation laws did not allow Japanese men residing in the United States to marry white women. This made it virtually impossible for Japanese American single men—particularly those in the mainland—to form families. While there has been some evidence that some *Issei* men married non-Japanese women of color, usually Chicanas and others of Mexican descent, such a practice was uncommon. Thus, it was perhaps a natural progression that many *Issei* men began to take advantage of the Gentlemen's Agreement to “import” wives from Japan, usually using one of the following three strategies. Men who were married in Japan and had left their wives behind brought them to the U.S. Some single men returned to Japan temporarily in search of brides to bring back to the United States; however, this option was not financially viable for most other single *Issei* men. Thus, most single *Issei* men contacted their relatives in Japan and asked for arranged marriages, whereby the bride and groom were introduced to each other

through photographs. The bride's family received a dowry, and the bride would take part in a wedding ceremony in Japan with a stand-in groom. Then, she would be given a passport to travel and arrive in the United States to meet her husband for the first time. Reportedly, 45,000 Japanese women moved to the United States as these *picture brides* (Kessler, 1993).

In response to this unanticipated influx of immigration, the U.S. government urged Japan to stop issuing passports for picture brides in 1921, under the “Ladies' Agreement.” This was then followed by the 1924 National Origins Quota System, which prevented all Asian nationals, including the Japanese, from moving to the United States. While the flow of picture brides was short lived, it contributed to a dramatic change in the demographic composition within the Japanese communities, particularly in the mainland United States. Most notably, Japanese American communities on the West Coast, which initially consisted primarily of temporary male laborers and working students, made a striking transition into enclaves of families—with intentions of remaining in the United States (Nakano, 1990).

The arrival of picture brides prompted not only a steep increase in the number of Japanese American women but also a drastic change in the profile of Japanese American communities. Indeed, the arrival of picture brides was instrumental in the establishment of strong and vibrant Japanese American communities in the mainland, because it usually entailed subsequent births of the *Nisei*: second-generation Japanese Americans. The formation of families and growing local networks made living in the United States more than a temporary earning opportunity to these families. Although the Gentlemen's Agreement allowed Japanese laborers residing in the United States to form families, Chinese laborers were not granted the same opportunity to send for their wives (Tung, 1974). This, combined with the antimiscegenation laws, prevented the Chinese American population from growing altogether (Miller, 1969). This difference partly explains the current difference between

the two Asian groups; most Chinese Americans are post-1965 immigrants, while the large majority of Japanese Americans are third- or higher-generation Americans.

Due to the births of the *Nisei*, the Japanese American communities on the West Coast, with major clusters in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle, expanded rapidly in the early 1900s. For example, in California, the Japanese American population grew from just over 10,000 in 1900 to almost 94,000 in 1940 (Thomas, Kikuchi, & Sakoda, 1952)—a ninefold increase. Nationwide, the number of American-born Japanese Americans grew to almost twice the number of their Japanese-born counterparts in 1940 (approximately 60,000 vs. 33,500), with a bulk of the former being under the age of 24 (see Yoo, 2000). This expansion of Japanese American population, in turn, induced further anti-Japanese sentiments, prompting policymakers to create a range of regulations so as to discourage additional Japanese American families from forming. Then, the onset of World War II further devastated the nascent development of Japanese American communities in the United States, with immigration from Japan being suspended and Japanese American enclaves on the West Coast being essentially dissolved (Hirobe, 2001).

The Third Wave: War Brides (1952 Through the 1960s)

The third wave of Japanese immigrants, like the preceding one, also consisted mainly of Japanese brides entering the United States—but under different circumstances. American military personnel and civilian staff stationed in Japan during and after World War II were predominantly white males, many of who were unmarried. Despite discouragement by the military, many of these American men established committed relationships with Japanese women, often resulting in engagement or marriage. Because migration from Japan was still strictly controlled, these American grooms initially faced legal challenges in trying to

bring their brides to the United States. Yet, some measures taken by the U.S. government aided the immigration of foreign fiancées and wives of American military personnel. The War Brides Act of 1945 allowed non-Asian American military personnel to bring their foreign wives and their underage children to the United States, and the same benefit was extended in 1947 to Asian American military personnel. Also, the Fiancée Law of 1946 permitted American military personnel to bring their foreign fiancées, provided that they officially married within 3 months of arrival (Glenn, 1986). However, it should be noted that these provisions initially did not stimulate the flow of Japanese war brides into the United States systematically, since there still existed a multitude of other discriminatory immigration policies controlling non-European immigration to the United States.

In June 1952, Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act, under which all Asian immigrants, including Japanese, became eligible for naturalization. While the 1952 Act assigned only a small quota of immigrants (100 per annum for each Asian country), family-based immigrants (e.g., spouses and unmarried children) were exempt from this quota. Thus, American citizens, including naturalized Japanese Americans, were freely able to bring their families to the United States, partially ending the pervasive ban on immigration from Japan during much of the twentieth century (Arnold, Minocha, & Fawcett, 1987). The influx of war brides marked the first rush of immigration from Japan since 1924. While statistics on war brides per se are unavailable, Glenn (1986) estimates the number of war brides admitted to the United States to be 45,000 between 1947 and 1975. Min's (chapter 3; Table 3.5) analysis points to the speculation that the number might have been even higher. The table shows that between 1950 and 1979, over 70,000 Japanese women migrated to the United States as wives of American citizens, and most of them are believed to have been war brides. Reflecting the surge of Japanese women entering the United States as brides, over 86% of the

Table 7.1 The Number of Immigrants From Japan Per Annum, 1950–1960, by Sex

Year	Total	Women	Men	Percentage Women
1950	45	29	16	64
1951	206	161	45	78
1952	4,734	4,581	153	97
1953	2,489	2,291	198	92
1954	4,062	3,377	685	83
1955	4,143	3,435	708	82
1956	5,622	4,280	1,342	76
1957	6,122	5,357	765	88
1958	6,427	5,559	868	86
1959	6,093	5,283	810	87
1960	5,636	4,812	824	85
Total	45,579	39,165	6,414	86
Annual Means	4,144	3,560	583	83

SOURCE: Nishi, 1995.

immigrants between 1952 and 1960 were women (see Table 7.1).

Naïve observers might idealize the notion of war brides, for they ostensibly moved across the Pacific Ocean in pursuit of romance. However, the reality was instead harsh for most of these women. In the climate of traditional gender role expectations and postwar recovery in Japan, war brides were equated with prostitutes. This is largely because the romantic encounters between American men and Japanese women usually transpired at parties: an arrangement that was inconsistent with the Japanese notions of female decency and socially acceptable courtship at the time. In addition, war brides have been given a name, *Pan Pan*, which is even more stigmatizing than the term for prostitutes. *Pan Pan* refers to prostitutes who financially benefited from the wealth of the enemy nation by selling themselves. As such, these women were usually denounced by their Japanese families and communities (Hayashi, 2002).

The conditions these women and their American husbands faced upon arriving in the United States were not any better (Glenn & Perreñas, 1996). Once in the United States, many

war brides realized that their American husbands were not financially stable, which forced these wives to work in inhumane conditions to support their families. Also, the prejudice faced by these women stemmed not only from the war-related anti-Japanese sentiments, but also from general racism prevalent throughout the United States at that time and from Americans' intolerance of interracial relationships. The husband's American family members were often unwilling to welcome his Japanese wife, and war brides were frequently shut out of the neighborhood communities. Socially isolated, some war brides reportedly experienced spousal abuse and were forced to live without any source of support (Takatsu, 2002).

Furthermore, these women faced discrimination within Japanese American communities, which shared the negative war bride stereotypes. Based on the assumption that these war brides had previously been prostitutes, it was commonly believed in the Japanese American communities that these brides frequently committed adultery and were unfit parents (Hayashi, 2002). The circle of discrimination did not end there, and blatant discrimination existed even within the war bride communities. It was reportedly common for war

brides married to white men to discriminate against their counterparts who were married to nonwhite men, preventing the latter from joining the small community of war brides (Takatsu, 2002). Thus, the experience of this wave of immigrants, consisting of war brides, is marked by a great deal of difficulties before and after arriving in the United States.

THE POST-1965 IMMIGRATION

The Immigration Act of 1965 was designed to abolish the discriminatory immigration policies that had long controlled immigration from many affected countries. The act, though primarily intended to benefit eastern and southern Europeans, quickly prompted a dramatic increase in immigration from Asia (Hing, 1994). However, immigration from Japan—which had averaged 5,000 to 6,000 annually during much of the preceding decade—decreased during the 1960s (see Figure 2.1, chapter 2). The improvement of the socioeconomic conditions in Japan in the 1960s—with the Olympics in Tokyo in 1964, the World Exposition in Osaka in 1970, followed by another Olympics in Sapporo in 1972—contributed to a lower volume of Japanese immigration during the post-1965 era. As shown in Table 7.2, the post-1965 immigration from Japan has steadily been low, hovering around 4,000 annually, while the immigration from most other Asian countries has skyrocketed during the same period (see Figure 2.3, chapter 2). This trend of low-volume immigration from Japan continued until 1999; then, in 2000, the number of migrants from Japan suddenly increased.

Notably, the number of Japanese individuals migrating to the United States practically doubled during the first 3 years of the current millennium (Table 7.2). What factors have contributed to this recent increase in Japanese immigration to the United States? First, the persistently ailing Japanese economy since the 1990s may now be motivating the Japanese to seek employment and education in the United States. Second, this increase may reflect Japanese women moving

away from the Japanese patriarchal tradition. Third, a larger number of women may be arriving in the United States as wives of American citizens. The last two of these factors involve gender-related concerns, and they will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

Fleeing From Patriarchy

Although there have been fluctuations in the number of immigrants from Japan per annum, one notable trend has been that women have consistently and overwhelmingly been the majority each year. In the 5-year period from 1965 to 1969, a total of 18,269 Japanese nationals immigrated to the United States, of whom 77% were women (Table 7.2). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS—now the Department of Homeland Security) reports that, during the 5-year period, about 10,000 women entered the United States specifically under the category of spouses of Americans, while only 641 Japanese men entered the country under the same category, reflecting the uneven gender distributions in the immigration of the Japanese to the United States. This sex difference, though slightly attenuated, persisted in the 1970s. According to the INS data, in the 5-year period from 1975 to 1979, 64% of Japanese immigrants to the United States were women. While the INS discontinued reporting the distribution of immigrants from Japan by sex in 1986, it can reasonably be speculated that the trend of female domination in Japanese immigration to the United States appears to have continued. The 1990 U.S. Census reported that 63% of the foreign-born Japanese were women, while the sex distribution among American-born Japanese Americans was, as expected, equally divided at 50% (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993b). What specific elements are involved in this gender imbalance?

The patriarchal traditions in Japan have seemingly been an important factor that has pushed Japanese women to move to the United States. While the Educational Foundations Law enacted in Japan in 1947 guaranteed equal access to education to all Japanese citizens, the patriarchal

Table 7.2 Post-1965 Immigration From Japan

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total # Admitted</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Wives</i>	<i>Husbands</i>	<i>Spouses</i>
1965	3,180	2,727	453	2,350	122	—
1966	3,394	2,687	707	1,991	143	—
1967	4,125	2,921	1,025	1,863	150	—
1968	3,613	2,726	887	1,845	132	—
1969	3,957	2,958	999	1,842	94	—
1970	4,485	3,291	1,194	2,104	150	—
1971	4,457	3,295	1,162	2,023	179	—
1972	4,757	3,403	1,354	1,626	190	—
1973	5,461	3,893	1,568	2,077	225	—
1974	4,860	3,380	1,480	1,773	186	—
1975	4,274	2,810	1,464	1,376	168	—
1976	4,258	2,702	1,556	1,238	214	—
1977	4,178	2,579	1,599	1,123	237	—
1978	4,010	2,595	1,415	1,214	209	—
1979	4,048	2,608	1,440	1,197	234	—
1980	4,225	—	—	—	—	1,445
1981	3,896	—	—	—	—	1,378
1982	3,903	2,250	1,434	—	—	1,451
1983	4,092	2,271	1,535	—	—	1,394
1984	4,043	2,452	1,591	—	—	1,443
1985	4,086	2,521	1,565	—	—	1,877
1986	3,959	—	—	—	—	2,093
1987	4,174	—	—	—	—	1,693
1988	4,512	—	—	—	—	1,873
1989	4,849	—	—	—	—	2,007
1990	5,734	—	—	—	—	2,167
1991	5,049	—	—	—	—	2,272
1992	11,028	—	—	—	—	2,237
1993	6,908	—	—	—	—	2,524
1994	6,093	—	—	—	—	3,021
1995	4,837	—	—	—	—	2,570
1996	6,011	—	—	—	—	2,831
1997	2,097	—	—	—	—	2,586
1998	5,138	—	—	—	—	2,446
1999	4,217	—	—	—	—	2,268
2000	7,094	—	—	—	—	4,037
2001	10,464	—	—	—	—	5,334
2002	8,301	—	—	—	—	4,390

SOURCE: The Annual Report of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (formerly the Statistical Year Book of the Immigration and Naturalization Service), 1965–2002.

NOTE: The INS did not report sex-based data in 1980 and 1981. It then stopped reporting data on sex for the Japanese after 1985, presumably due to the low volume of immigration from Japan relative to other nations. Additionally, the INS ceased reporting the numbers of marriage-based immigration by sex in 1979; as of 1980, the numbers are reported under a consolidated category, *spouses*.

traditions beyond the school systems in Japan have only slowly been modified in the decades following World War II. For instance, most wives still refer to their husbands as *shujin*, which translates into *master* or the *main person*, while husbands often refer to their wives as *kanai*, which literally translates as *inside the home*. These linguistic characteristics, as Whorf and Carroll (1956) and Luria (1979) would suggest, relate closely to the deep-rooted patriarchal attitudes and practices prevalent in Japan (also see Cherry, 1992, for a humorous discussion on the Japanese language and gender roles). Wives continue to be socially obligated to stay at home and provide services to their husbands, who are expected to pursue careers outside the home as main providers (Makino, 1999; Shirahase, 2001). When women violate these gender role expectations, they often face a great deal of social ostracism as well as other difficulties (Imamura, 1987).

Not surprisingly, these traditional gender role expectations are reflected in the employment practices in Japan. Many college-educated women encounter the reality that companies prefer to employ men to women, particularly for the positions with potential for advancement and growth. Midori Nakano (1997), a contemporary novelist, humorously describes her job-seeking experiences. When she graduated from Waseda University—one of the most prestigious universities in Japan—she was only able to gain employment as a receptionist at a publishing company, a dead-end job in her view. Reportedly, Japanese companies continue to prefer male candidates for positions with potential for advancement, as they expect women to resign in a few years to marry and have children—following the traditional gender role expectations outlined earlier. Moreover, employed women face discrimination in promotion and financial compensation; full-time female workers earned 34% less than their male counterparts in Japan in 2002 (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare of Japan, 2002). In New York, I have met a number of Japanese women who moved to the United States to escape these frustrating professional experiences.

In the late 1980s, Harumi and Hiromi, who had graduated from junior college, were both employed as entry-level office workers at financial institutions in Japan. Soon, they began to notice that their male colleagues, who had been hired with them with similar educational backgrounds and qualifications, were given more responsibilities and higher salaries. These women were frequently referred to as *ocha kumi* (tea-serving girls), whose primary responsibilities consisted of menial tasks such as making sure that all male workers' teacups remained full throughout the day, answering phones, and making photocopies. Like many of their female peers, they began to consider temporarily moving to the United States as students in order to make themselves more competitive in the job market.

Out of the disillusionment they experienced at work, Harumi and Hiromi decided to polish their English language by attending a public university in New York, where they earned their bachelor's degrees in business. They had initially intended to return to Japan to seek employment, but most job opening announcements in Japan stipulated that women must be under the age of 25 and *yōshi tanrei* (physically attractive) to apply. Although this practice has been prohibited under Japan's Gender Equity in Employment Opportunities Law enacted between 1997 and 1999, it is still covertly practiced in Japan (Gelb, 2003). Therefore, upon graduation these women felt lucky to find employment at Japanese corporations in New York, which were operating under the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity laws.

The above-mentioned Japanese women have since obtained their permanent residency in the United States, gone through several promotions, survived downsizing and systematic layoffs, and become key employees in their corporations. Neither of these women could have attained this level of career success had they remained in or returned to Japan. These success stories, combined with the reality that women in Japan need to have added skills in order to be competitive in the male-dominated job market, have fueled Japanese women's interest in studying abroad, usually in the

United States, for future career advancement. This has increasingly become common since the late 1980s, as Japan's economic strengths have permeated through its middle class, allowing many disillusioned female workers to earn sufficient salaries to fund their studies abroad. In fact, several magazines specifically target younger women considering such study-abroad opportunities. It should also be noted here that the traditional gender role expectations in Japan outlined above would also function to deter men from seeking to migrate from Japan, as their traditional family and career obligations would be greatly incompatible with such a move. This further contributes to the gender imbalance in immigration from Japan to the United States.

Securing and advancing a meaningful career is not the only challenge to women in Japan (Takahashi, 1997). For example, the strict gender role expectations may force Japanese working women to assume all domestic chores—not because they cannot financially afford to hire maids but because of the gender role expectations—with no regard to the magnitude of professional contributions they make. Many such women attempt to escape these situations by either remaining unmarried, which still carries negative connotations in Japan, or by seeking career opportunities overseas—frequently in the U.S. Many female professionals in Japan may hence find it difficult to balance the multiple roles they assume in Japan, as the society has yet to adapt to the idea of gender equality. This situation prompts some of them to seek refuge in the United States, which they idealize somewhat naively to be a feminist haven.

Internet Brides

As noted earlier, the primary reason for earlier waves of Japanese women to move to the United States was marriage, marked by the advent of picture brides and war brides. Interestingly, there may be a new wave of marriage-based women immigrants from Japan in recent years: Internet brides. As a result of the rapid advancement of the

Internet and the ever-expanding international travel for the masses, a new wave of *Issei* women may be emerging. While no official statistics are available and no research has been conducted on the topic, there has been some anecdotal evidence of many Japanese women moving to New York as Internet brides recently, by meeting their prospective husbands over the Internet across the Pacific Ocean. Like the original picture brides a century ago, these Internet brides met their would-be husbands initially via photographs; this time, however, the exchanges took place not through family matchmakers but through the Internet. Unlike picture brides, these women had the benefit of visiting their prospective husbands prior to eventually assuming their permanent homes in New York, knowing that they were free to return to Japan if they did not find the relationships with these men satisfactory. Internet brides are inherently different than mail-order brides from impoverished nations (see chapter 8), as economic concerns do not dictate the transaction and the women usually have the financial resources to exit the relationships if they so desire.

In an interview, one such bride, Mami, stated that she had always been attracted to African American men—like those celebrities she had seen in American hip-hop videos while living in Japan. With a bachelor's degree in business, she was working for an American financial corporation when, at the age of 33, she placed a personal advertisement on an American-based Internet dating site. Disillusioned by the Japanese society, in which she felt out of place as an unmarried woman in her thirties, she wished to live in New York, where she felt that she would be able to find a compatible man and perhaps succeed as a businesswoman. Mami corresponded with several African American and other black men in the New York City area for several weeks before traveling to New York. While staying with a friend in New York, she went on dates with a number of the men with whom she had gotten acquainted on the Internet. Within 2 weeks, she was engaged to an African American man over a dozen years her senior.

During the 2 years Mami has been married to her husband, she has faced some unforeseen challenges. Although his family has accepted Mami, she has found it difficult to understand the family expectations in an unfamiliar community. For example, her husband, who has not been consistently employed, has children—some almost as old as she is—with several women, whom he frequently visits. In addition, Mami is routinely asked to take care of these children, which may entail driving them to their mothers' residences out of state. Given these circumstances, despite the dire financial need, Mami has only been able to keep part-time employment performing menial tasks. She does not feel that she has gained genuine acceptance in the Japanese American communities in New York, which consist largely of students, professionals, and their families. Consequently, she finds little social and emotional support in facing the exigent realities and routinely considers divorce. Many aspects of her experience, incidentally, resemble the stories of her predecessors: picture brides and war brides. The experiences and future of these Internet brides from Japan, thus, deserve to be investigated more closely.

POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

Population Changes

In 1970, there were almost 600,000 Japanese Americans in the United States, composing the largest Asian American group then. In the 2000 Census, when individuals were allowed for the first time to select multiple racial/ethnic categories, approximately 800,000 identified themselves solely as Japanese Americans, compared to about 350,000 who reported their partial Japanese ancestry along with one or more additional ethnic/racial categories. The growth rate of the Japanese population is unimpressive compared to most other major Asian groups, who have experienced a dramatic increase in immigration (see Figure 2.3 in chapter 2). Consequently, Japanese Americans

have shifted from being the largest Asian group in 1970 to the smallest group among the six major Asian groups by 2000. In 1970, Japanese Americans accounted for 41% of Asian Americans, but the proportion dropped to about 8% in 2000. Many scholars attribute this decrease to a combination of factors, such as a low birth rate among Japanese American women and the smaller number of immigrants arriving from Japan relative to other Asian countries.

A notable factor contributing to the diminishing numerical prevalence of Japanese Americans may involve a decrease in the number of individuals of Japanese descent employed by Japanese corporations in the United States, as a result of the severe downturn in the Japanese "bubble" economy since the 1990s (Bergsten, Ito, & Noland, 2001). Due to the ailing economy in Japan, many Japanese corporations closed or drastically downsized their U.S. operations, which forced many families of Japanese descent to move to or return to Japan. This also meant that the local businesses (e.g., stores, restaurants, travel and real estate agencies, beauty salons, and so on) supporting these Japanese Americans faced hardships, further contributing to the deterioration of Japanese American enclaves. This can be seen in Los Angeles's Little Tokyo, where many small businesses previously owned by Japanese Americans are now owned by Korean and Chinese Americans, and are serving a growing number of non-Japanese Asian populations (Befu, 2002). A similar trend has been observed on the East Coast. In the 1980s, there were heavy concentrations of Japanese-owned businesses and Japanese American community organizations in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and in Scarsdale, New York. But most of them have now been either closed or taken over by other Asian Americans.

In addition to the low rate of population growth, the population characteristics of Japanese American also differ from those of other Asian American groups, in terms of the prevalence of intermarriages and the dominance of third- or higher-generation Americans within their

Table 7.3 Outmarriage Rates () Among Japanese Americans and All Asian Americans by Nativity, Based on the 1990 Census (in percentages)

<i>Japanese Americans</i>		<i>All Asians Americans</i>	
Total	35.7%	Total	21.2%
Men	24.8%	Men	14.1%
Women	43.9%	Women	27.1%
Native-Born Total	31.2%	Native-Born Total	40.1%
Men	28.2%	Men	37.7%
Women	34.2%	Women	42.5%
Foreign-Born Total	42.3%	Foreign-Born Total	17.4%
Men	17.3%	Men	9.1%
Women	54.3%	Women	24.3%

SOURCE: Lee & Fernandez, 1998.

communities. According to the analyses of the 1990 Census data by Lee and Fernandez (1998), among the Asian American groups, Japanese Americans are most likely to marry people outside of their heritage. As shown in Table 7.3, their analyses reveal that over a third (36%) of Japanese Americans married spouses who were not of Japanese ancestry. This outmarriage rate is strikingly high, compared to other Asian American groups (21% for all Asian Americans).

A further analysis reveals that the Japanese outmarriage rate is especially high for *Issei* women; over a half (54%) of foreign-born Japanese women are married to non-Japanese partners. On the other hand, foreign-born Japanese men are much less likely to be outmarried, although their 17% outmarriage rate is still the highest among other foreign-born Asian populations. Curiously, outmarriages are less prevalent among American-born Japanese Americans than among American-born members of other Asian American groups (e.g., 31% for U.S.-born Japanese Americans, compared to 65% and 72% for U.S.-born Filipino Americans and Korean Americans, respectively). Still, Japanese Americans have the highest outmarriage rate overall, as the predominant majority of them are native born (also see Hwang, Saenz, & Aguirre, 1994).

What are the ethnic backgrounds of the outmarried Japanese Americans? According to Lee and Fernandez's study (1998), most outmarried Japanese Americans were married to non-Hispanic white partners (65%), while 20% were married to non-Japanese Asian Americans—usually East Asians. It should be noted that, of the outmarried Japanese Americans, the proportion marrying non-Hispanic whites decreased between 1980 and 1990 (from 78% to 65%), whereas the proportion of those marrying other Asian Americans increased from 12% to 20%. This is a trend found for other Asian American groups as well, which may be attributed to the phenomenal increase in the Asian American population over the last four decades.

Finally, another characteristic that sets Japanese Americans apart from other Asian American groups is that third- or higher-generation Japanese Americans make up the majority of their population, whereas they make up a small fraction of the population for other Asian groups. Logan's (2001) analysis of the 1998–2000 Current Population Survey results indicate that foreign-born immigrants accounted for 23% of Japanese Americans, compared to 76% of Vietnamese Americans and 52% of Korean Americans (see Table 12.1, chapter 12). Furthermore, this figure




Figure 7.1 The Recent Settlement Patterns of Japanese Americans (1990 and 2000 Censuses)

SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993a, 2000.

for Japanese Americans represents a sharp decrease, from 35% in 1990. In addition, the proportion of multiple-generation (i.e., third- or higher-generation) Japanese Americans made up the majority (55%) of Japanese Americans during the 1998–2000 period. This may mean that Japanese Americans are assimilated into American society to a greater extent than are other Asian American groups.

Settlement Patterns

The settlement of Japanese Americans in the pre-1965 era, as discussed earlier, revolved mainly around Hawaii and western states, such as California, Washington, and Oregon. As will be discussed in a later section, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II proved to be an initial systematic push for Japanese Americans to move to the Eastern U.S. Nevertheless, the current distribution of Japanese Americans is not too far off from these early

settlement patterns. As shown in Figure 7.1, the states of California, Hawaii, New York, Washington, and Illinois had the largest concentrations of Japanese Americans in 1990 and 2000, with a large bulk of them in California and Hawaii. Nevertheless, the fluctuations in population varied greatly across these five states. Although there was only a modest increase in the Japanese American population as a whole between 1990 and 2000, there was a noted decrease in the number of Japanese Americans during the same period in California (by 8%), Hawaii (by 15%), and Illinois (by 7%). By contrast, there was a moderate rate of increase in the Japanese American population in New York (by 6%) and Washington (by 5%). Thus, the Japanese American population has shown a moderate geographical diversification in the 1990s.

A closer look at the 2000 Census data reveals that approximately 56% of Japanese Americans live in the following three metropolitan areas: Honolulu, Los Angeles, and San Francisco (Table 7.4).

Table 7.4 Distribution of Japanese Americans in Selected Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs), Based on the 1990 and 2000 Censuses

	1990	Percentage of Total Japanese Americans	2000	Percentage of Total Japanese Americans
Honolulu	195,149	24	161,224	24
L.A.	173,370	21	155,959	22
S.F.	78,769	10	76,402	10
N.Y.C.	47,608	6	49,707	6
Seattle	26,801	3	41,169	3
Others	293,750	36	312,239	35
U.S. Total	815,447	100	796,700	100

SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993a, 2000.

NOTE: Although people were allowed for the first time in Census 2000 to select multiple ethnic categories, Summary File 1, from which this data was taken, only reports those who solely selected Japanese.

New York City has the fourth largest Japanese population, with 6%. Manhattan in New York City, an international center of trade and finance, has housed a large number of branches of Japanese corporations; as a result, New York City has become a major hub for Japanese Americans over the past three decades. While Japanese firms are also located in California and Hawaii, the circumstances in New York significantly differ from these two states. For one, since there have never been sizable clusters of Japanese Americans in New York City, only a negligible number of locals are typically hired at these corporations. Instead, a large number of Japanese workers have been directly transferred from these corporations' headquarters in Japan, and these "imported" workers are joined by a smaller number of U.S.-born Japanese Americans, frequently from the West Coast (Fang, 1996). Most of these workers of Japanese descent in New York City, thus, have no inherent ties to the city, and many have indeed returned to their places of origin upon completion of their services at these corporations. By contrast, in California and Hawaii, people of Japanese descent employed at Japanese businesses include a substantial portion of locals, whose families have been present in the local communities over generations.

Although this historical continuity in California and Hawaii may appear beneficial, it has prompted conflicts between newly arriving Japanese corporations and long-established Japanese American communities (Befu, 2002). Beginning in the 1970s, a great deal of community activism took place to prevent Little Tokyo in Los Angeles, which had long provided support and services to local Japanese American residents, from becoming a commercial site surrounding Japanese corporations, their employees, and tourists from Japan. However, the local residents' efforts proved unsuccessful. By the mid-1980s, Little Tokyo had become an almost exclusively business- and tourist-oriented enclave, with enormous Japanese-owned hotels, restaurants, and stores serving the temporary residents and tourists from Japan. The following three major factors seem to have contributed to the virtual decimation of the small businesses and community agencies that used to offer support to the local Japanese-American residences in Little Tokyo.

First, local small businesses and community organizations were unable to compete with more powerful economic forces arriving from Japan. Second, the arrival of large Japanese corporations

and their employees drastically raised the real estate market in and around Little Tokyo, forcing Japanese American residents and businesses to relocate. Third, even when the local businesses were able to survive in Little Tokyo, they quickly realized that it would be more profitable to shift their marketing niche and cater to Japanese corporations, their workers, and visitors. Hence, Little Tokyo was transformed from a Japanese American residential neighborhood to a commercial and sightseeing area.

Ironically, as outlined by Saxonhouse (2001), the ailing Japanese economy discussed earlier has reduced the dominance of Japanese corporations across the United States since the early 1990s, which subsequently prompted a rapid decline in the presence of Japanese workers and tourists in Japanese American communities, such as Little Tokyo in Los Angeles. As a result, as mentioned earlier, many businesses have now become defunct and the transient members of the community have departed. Subsequently, much of Little Tokyo has since been taken over by other Asian groups, whose presence in the area has been growing dramatically in recent years. Thus, the community resistance toward the commercialization of Little Tokyo in the 1970s was perhaps justified in hindsight, as transient Japanese corporations, workers, and visitors indeed appear to have contributed to the dissolving of an enclave that once served as a secure base for local Japanese Americans.

SOCIOECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS

Socioeconomic Adjustments in the Earlier Period

As described previously, the vast majority of earlier Japanese immigrants in the late nineteenth century came to the United States as laborers and student laborers with little or no money. Then, the Japanese business participation gradually began to grow on the West Coast in the early 1900s, mainly in businesses that required little initial investment, such as retail stores, restaurants, and

farming and gardening, most frequently in Japanese American neighborhoods (Ichihashi, 1932). It is estimated that, by World War II, approximately three quarters of the Japanese Americans in Seattle were involved in Japanese-owned businesses, and similar patterns had transpired in other Western urban areas such as Los Angeles and San Francisco (Bonacich & Modell, 1980).

In suburban areas, Japanese Americans became highly concentrated in the farming industry and proved to be highly productive. Japanese American farmers, for example, successfully implemented the Japanese irrigation methods that gave life to lands that were previously thought barren. These Japanese American farms continued to grow, despite various Alien Land Laws across the Western states, which prevented non-citizens from owning lands (e.g., the 1913 Alien Land Law in California; see Okutsu, 1995). According to Takaki (1998; also see 1987), Japanese Americans circumvented these exclusionary stipulations by designating U.S. citizens in their social networks as the legal owners of their properties. Thus, Japanese American small businesses and farms thrived on the properties owned by their *Nisei* family members and relatives, or sometimes even their dependable white American associates. These small business and farm enterprises had thus become integral parts of the Japanese American economy by World War II. Although these businesses and farms typically involved uncompensated family labor and provided menial positions, this form of economic solidarity greatly facilitated the subsequent social mobility of Japanese Americans. In fact, it has been pointed out that Japanese Americans, as people of color, would not have advanced socioeconomically as steadily and rapidly as they did, had they remained as low-wage, menial employees outside of their communities.

Bonacich and Modell (1980) note that a variety of circumstances contributed to this high rate of Japanese American economic solidarity. Perhaps the most critical motivator prompting these laborers to become entrepreneurs in their own enclaves

was the blatant climate of racism in the United States, which limited their labor participation in the mainstream market in any capacity beyond menial laborers. Japanese American small enterprises generally did not have the means or intentions to expand into the mainstream economy and deal directly with white Americans. This isolated ethnic economy, whether intended or not, functioned to buffer some of the consequences of racism.

At the same time, Japanese Americans' active participation in education was evident, even when the climate of racial oppression was at its peak (Flewelling & Hirabayashi, 2002). Based on 1940 data, Thomas, Kikuchi, and Sakoda (1952) indicated that the *Nisei* in California and Washington had a higher school attendance rate than the general population. The high levels of academic achievements among the *Nisei*, however, often went unrewarded. Yoo (2000) illustrates an early-twentieth-century experience of a *Nisei* man, who had graduated with good grades from a top-ranked university, only to find himself unemployable in the mainstream market due to his Japanese ancestry. Japanese Americans taking control of their own communities through owning small farms and businesses and further employing family and community members, therefore, was a major catalyst for socioeconomic success of the subsequent generations of Japanese Americans (Hirschman & Wong, 1986). Then, a series of circumstances surrounding World War II fueled the success of Japanese Americans in the mainstream economy.

Upon returning from their incarceration during World War II, Japanese Americans found themselves without the familiar occupational bases within the Japanese American communities on the West Coast (Fugita & O'Brien, 1991), which prompted many families to escape the West Coast and move to other areas, such as Chicago, with no established Japanese-American social networks (Bonacich & Modell, 1980). Fortunately, however, the booming postwar economy had created many white-collar jobs for educated, eager, and talented

individuals—including Japanese Americans—throughout the country. Moreover, the emerging civil rights movement began to lead to a gradual decrease in blatantly racist employment practices across the nation, culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which led to the creation of a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity to safeguard employees from systemic racial discrimination (Loevy, 1997). This combination of events propelled Japanese Americans to steadily expand their prominence outside the Japanese American communities.

Recent Educational Attainments

As seen in Table 7.5, the 2000 Census data reveal an impressive picture of educational attainments among Japanese Americans. In education, Japanese Americans far exceed white Americans across the board. The high school incompleteness rate among Japanese Americans is negligible, and their higher education completion rates are exceedingly high. The majority of native-born Japanese Americans (52%) completed college, compared to less than 30% for white Americans. In particular, the educational characteristics of foreign-born Japanese American men, with almost a quarter of them having completed advanced degrees, exemplify the high level of educational attainments among Japanese Americans. Even though native-born Japanese American women have a slightly higher college completion rate than their male counterparts, foreign-born women have a much lower college completion rate than their male counterparts. Given that there is a persistent gender gap in education in Japan, this gender disparity among foreign-born Japanese Americans is not surprising. Moreover, as previously noted, there are gender differences in the circumstances of immigration. A bulk of Japanese women have entered the United States as wives of American citizens; by contrast, many Japanese men moved to the United States to work for Japanese corporations as managers or professionals.

Table 7.5 The Educational Attainments of Japanese Americans and Total Asians by Sex and Nativity, and Non-Latino Whites by Sex, Based on the 2000 Census Data (in percentages)

	<i>High School Completed</i>	<i>College Completed</i>	<i>Advanced Degrees Completed (Masters, Professional, & Doctorate)</i>
Japanese Americans			
Total	96.4	51.3	16.0
Men	96.9	57.1	19.7
Women	96.0	46.6	12.8
Native Born Total	97.3	51.5	16.1
Men	97.1	50.7	16.9
Women	97.5	52.3	15.3
Foreign Born Total	95.2	51.1	15.7
Men	96.6	67.6	24.3
Women	94.4	40.9	10.3
All Asian Americans			
Total	83.7	47.3	18.7
Men	85.7	50.9	23.4
Women	81.9	44.2	14.6
Native Born Total	93.9	51.5	17.6
Men	93.6	50.5	18.1
Women	94.3	52.5	17.1
Foreign Born Total	82.2	46.7	18.9
Men	84.4	50.9	24.3
Women	80.2	43.0	14.2
White Non-Hispanic Natives			
Total	89.9	29.5	10.3
Men	89.0	30.4	11.0
Women	90.8	28.7	9.6

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of Census 2000.

Other Asian groups, too, have rather impressive educational attainments, and virtually all of the notable educational characteristics of Japanese Americans also apply to Asian Americans overall. For example, 19% of Asian Americans—compared to 16% of Japanese Americans—hold advanced degrees. However, there is a remarkable difference in their high-school incompleteness rates. In particular, while over 95% of foreign-born Japanese Americans hold high school diplomas, the high school completion rate is lower for

foreign-born Asian Americans overall (82%). This exceptionally high high-school completion rate among foreign-born Japanese Americans can be explained by the fact that the high school completion rate in Japan is among the highest in the world, with 87% of 18-year-olds having completed high school in 2001 (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan, 2001), compared to 80% for the U.S. population over the age of 25 in the 2000 Census (DP-2).

Table 7.6 The Occupational Characteristics of Japanese Americans and Total Asians by Sex and Nativity, and Non-Latino Whites by Sex, Based on the 2000 Census Data (%)

	<i>Management and Business-Finance</i>	<i>Professionals and Other Related Occupations</i>
Japanese Americans		
Total	20.7	30.9
Men	24.9	30.3
Women	16.6	31.6
Native Born Total	19.7	31.7
Men	20.8	29.8
Women	18.5	33.8
Foreign Born Total	22.2	29.7
Men	31.9	31.1
Women	13.9	28.6
All Asian Americans		
Total	14.2	30.4
Men	15.2	32.1
Women	13.3	28.6
Native Born Total	18.5	33.1
Men	18.2	32.1
Women	18.7	34.3
Foreign Born Total	13.6	29.9
Men	14.6	32.1
Women	12.5	27.7
White Non-Hispanic Natives		
Total	15.6	22.1
Men	17.4	18.0
Women	13.6	26.7

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of Census 2000.

Recent Occupational Adjustment

Table 7.6 summarizes the occupational characteristics of Japanese Americans based on the 2000 Census. The majority of Japanese Americans (52%) held managerial, business-finance, or professional occupations. This proportion is much higher than that of white Americans (38%) and higher than the proportion of Asian Americans as a whole (47%). In particular, foreign-born Japanese American men are overrepresented in managerial and business-finance positions (32%),

compared to 17% of their white American male counterparts and 15% of foreign-born Asian American men.

To explain the overrepresentation of foreign-born Japanese men in managerial and professional occupations, we need to pay close attention to the role of Japanese corporations in the United States (Fang, 1996; Fawcett & Arnold, 1987). Fang mentions that, in 1987, American divisions of Japanese-based corporations employed nearly 300,000 workers in the U.S. While these firms also employed many local workers with no ties to

Japan, such employees tended to hold positions in the lower strata within those corporations. The remaining positions, which include management, professional (e.g., CPAs and attorneys), and executive positions, are usually filled by delegates from their home corporations in Japan, new Japanese recruits sent from Japan, or Japanese Americans hired locally, in order to facilitate their transpacific business transactions (also see Johnson, 1977). This created a situation whereby highly educated Japanese and Japanese American men were recruited to be placed in the higher echelons of their corporate world.

Although highly educated foreign-born Japanese Americans, usually men, succeeded occupationally, other equally highly educated Asian immigrants have not enjoyed the same level of success in the United States, as shown in Table 7.6. This disparity may stem from the fact that foreign-born Japanese Americans could find employment as managers and professionals in Japanese-owned corporations in the United States. Other Asian immigrants have a major disadvantage over Japanese immigrants in attaining managerial and professional occupations, because they must gain employment outside of their own ethnic communities, where they face linguistic and other social barriers. As a result, non-Japanese Asian immigrants tend to be underemployed compared to their counterparts from Japan with similar educational backgrounds.

Thus, the prominence of Japanese elite businessmen in the United States has enhanced the overall professional profiles of Japanese Americans, especially among foreign-born Japanese men. Still, we must not forget that the occupational success among Japanese Americans extends beyond the business executives of Japanese descent. It is apparent from Table 7.6 that native-born Japanese Americans are also very successful in occupational adjustment. These trends of Japanese American occupational success are clearly reflected in the average annual household income of Japanese Americans (\$91,000), which is higher than the figures for non-Hispanic whites (\$70,000) or all

Asian groups combined (\$77,000; see Sakamoto & Xie in chapter 4 of this book). It is not surprising that Japanese Americans, most of whom consist of multigenerations, do better than other Asian groups with similar educational levels.

The overall occupational and financial accomplishments of Japanese Americans clearly suggest that they have, to a great extent, been structurally assimilated into the mainstream American society (see Portes, 1987, for further information on structural assimilation). It should, however, be noted that, despite this overall success, Japanese Americans continue to be underrepresented as CEOs and senior executives at major corporations to this day, and Japanese Americans are not as well compensated as their white American counterparts with similar job functions and educational backgrounds—even in nonbusiness fields such as nonprofit and higher education organizations (Iino, 2000).

THE EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION

Formal Discrimination in the Earlier Period

As noted earlier, Japanese Americans entered the United States primarily as laborers in the late 1880s, actively participating in a variety of labor activities. White American politicians and labor organizations on the West Coast considered Japanese Americans to be a labor threat, because *Issei*, like Chinese laborers, were willing to work for low wages under the harshest conditions, while earning a reputation of being highly productive (Melendy, 1972). They were also thought to be a cultural threat, as Japanese Americans were believed to be incapable of adapting to the American lifestyles. Yoo (2000) describes an incident in which James Phelan, mayor of San Francisco from 1896 to 1902, stated that Japanese Americans were deficient in every way—from their family values, to support for churches, to their dedication to the nation. These negative sentiments, combined with Japan's victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, prompted the

San Francisco Chronicle, a newspaper agency which had maintained neutrality up to that point, to print a sensational but inaccurate article alerting American citizens of the Japanese invasion of San Francisco (Japanese American Citizens League, 2002). This report, not surprisingly, further fueled the anti-Japanese sentiment.

In the subsequent decades, a sequence of exclusionary provisions were made, reflecting such a discriminatory climate. In 1922, Japan was named among a list of countries whose citizens could not become naturalized in the United States, and a succeeding immigration law in 1924 banned immigration from these countries, ending the steady flow of migration from Japan abruptly. As an added effort, the Cable Act of 1922 was enacted to strip female American citizens of their citizenship if they married men from the countries whose citizens were not allowed to be naturalized—while the same was not the case if male American citizens were to marry females who could not be naturalized. This same provision further stipulated that foreign women could not become American citizens through marriage (see Yamamoto, Chon, Izumi, & Wu, 2001, chap. 2, for a detailed discussion of a series of legal exclusions faced by Japanese Americans). While nowhere in these regulations were the Japanese or Japanese Americans singled out, it was clear that these laws had partly been designed to prevent the growth of the Japanese American population. This is because it was common for *Nisei* women, who were American citizens, to marry *Issei* men who were noncitizens, yet such a practice would result in these women's American citizenships being revoked under the Cable Act. Similarly, while *Nisei* men routinely married *Issei* women, these women were no longer able to be naturalized. Because only naturalized citizens could vote, these measures also functioned to control the number of votes by Japanese Americans, which further weakened their political influences. They encountered further legal exclusions as noncitizens in the Western states, whereby they were prevented from becoming landowners—or even from leasing land

beyond a short period (e.g., the 1913 Alien Land Law in California). These legal exclusions severely restricted noncitizens' access to properties where they could conduct business and farming (Okutsu, 1995).

In response to these discriminatory laws, concerned individuals of Japanese descent established the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) in 1929 in order to promote the civil rights of Japanese Americans (Fiset & Nomura, 2005). The efforts by JACL were instrumental in both the 1931 amendment to the Cable Act, which allowed *Nisei* to maintain their American citizenship upon marrying *Issei*, and the subsequent repeal of the Act in 1939. Despite this repeal, however, the Japanese American communities had already been impacted adversely through two decades of punitive legal exclusions and sanctioned discrimination.

Despite these discriminatory practices, only a small number of Japanese laborers chose to return to Japan. Why did these laborers choose to remain in the United States despite these aversive experiences? First, these men were determined to pursue their educational and financial goals, and the realities of discrimination did not prove to be sufficient deterrents of such efforts. Second, these individuals may have believed that their future life prospects would still be better in the United States, as Japan was still an underdeveloped country with few opportunities for socioeconomic advancement. Either way, further explorations of this issue may help us fill the gap in our knowledge of early Japanese migration to the United States.

The Internment of Japanese Americans

As illustrated, multiple layers of legal exclusions and policies against Japanese Americans had long existed prior to the 1940s. None, however, equaled the unprecedented inhumanity posed by the legally sanctioned exclusion of Japanese Americans during World War II. When the war permeated through most of Europe by 1940, the United States and Japan, while maintaining neutrality, were supportive of opposing sides of the

war. It should be noted, however, that the United States and Japan were already in conflict even before the war broke out. For example, the United States intervention with Japan's continuing efforts to invade China and Korea had caused animosity among the Japanese, while Americans had trade-related frustrations with Japan (McClains, 1994). When the Japanese military attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the tensions between the two countries reached an irreconcilable level, leading to war between the two countries. In the United States, blatant anti-Japanese American movements began to emerge toward their internment. Although the steps toward the internment are briefly outlined below, interested readers should refer to Ng (2002) for a more complete discussion.

Immediately following the attack, FBI agents raided the residences of Japanese Americans in search of evidence of espionage, only to find nothing to substantiate their suspicion. Thousands of Japanese Americans were arrested without the most basic due process safeguards; their families were not informed of the nature of the charges or the availability of counsel, nor were they made aware of the location or the duration of the detention. With similar swiftness, the Secretary of the Navy and publisher of the Chicago Daily News, Colonel Frank Knox, launched his own campaign against Japanese Americans by falsely reporting that Japanese Americans had been found to be responsible for arranging the attack on Pearl Harbor as saboteurs and spies (Daniels, 1993). Although the government investigation quickly found this and other similar accusations unwarranted, government agencies reportedly suppressed such findings of innocence and unfairly arrested the accused anyhow. President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared the Japanese, German, and Italian nationals (i.e., non-U.S. citizens) residing in the United States to be "enemy aliens," imposing restrictions on the daily activities of these individuals. However, the experiences of the Japanese differed greatly from those of the Germans and Italians. First, whereas many of

the German and Italian noncitizens residing in the United States were sojourners who had elected not to pursue U.S. citizenships, the Japanese had been prevented by law from doing so, as described earlier. As such, the noncitizen status of many *Issei* should not have been interpreted as their noncommitment to the nation. Second, the *Nisei*, despite their U.S. citizenship, were also subject to the same constraints. The same scenario did not apply to U.S. citizens of German or Italian descent, who were generally considered white (Daniels, Taylor, & Kitano, 1986). These racially motivated differential treatments climaxed in the subsequent internment of Japanese Americans.

The genesis of the internment of Japanese Americans came from General John DeWitt of the U.S. Army, who filed a report titled "Final Report: Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast." In his report, DeWitt urged the government to remove all individuals of Japanese descent from the West Coast. This report later became notorious for its dubious logic. In the report, DeWitt stated that individuals of Japanese descent needed to be relocated from the West Coast because the very fact that they had not engaged in any sabotaging efforts to that date was disturbing and a confirming indication that such action would take place. Despite a series of serious logical flaws, his recommendations gained overwhelming support from white Americans (Daniels, 1993).

Although the idea of internment had been suggested in Hawaii, Army Commander General D. C. Emmons adamantly rejected this possibility, citing that Japanese Americans represented a significant segment of the population in Hawaii and that the United States needed them in order to effectively recover from the damages from the attack. Unfortunately, Emmons's view was not shared by the activists and policymakers in the mainland. In particular, many business, labor, and trade organizations supported the removal of the Japanese from the West Coast, not because they were concerned about national security but arguably because they saw an opportunity to

regain their labor and business monopoly (Daniels, 1993; Yoo, 2000).

The War Department eventually approved DeWitt's recommendations, and President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, authorizing the Army to establish internment camps to coercively imprison Japanese Americans on the West Coast (Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, 1982). The collaborative efforts among President Roosevelt and various governmental agencies facilitated the mass incarcerations of Japanese Americans from the West Coast without any due process, criminal investigations, or the filing of charges (Robinson, 2003). Within a month of the signing of Executive Order 9066, the War Relocation Authority (WRA) was formed to enforce the internment of Japanese Americans, relocating over 110,000 individuals over a period of 8 months. Reminiscent of the Jewish experience with the Nazis, Japanese Americans on the West Coast were forced to abandon their properties and other possessions, as they were only allowed to bring the staples they could carry with them (Inada, 2000). They were then transported in overcrowded busses and trains for hours without knowing their destinations.

As reported in Hansen's (1991) work, the severity of the economic and psychosocial devastations associated with leaving home quickly was only matched by the harsh conditions Japanese Americans faced during the internment. They were initially taken to prisonlike "Assembly Centers." Crowded and unsanitary tarpaper barracks and horse stalls, without privacy or plumbing, surrounded by barbed wires, became their temporary homes, where they were only provided with services barely adequate for survival (Cooper, 2000). Within a few months, incarcerated Japanese Americans were transferred from the temporary camps to 10 permanent WRA camps in uninhabitable remote areas, such as deserts or swamps on the West Coast. At these permanent camps, the detainees found themselves in unsanitary living quarters consisting of overcrowded small rooms

with cots, with no other furniture or plumbing, which caused many detainees to become ill (Kessler, 1993). Still, the incarcerated attempted to make the best of the situation. Some families were blessed with babies, among whom was Carole Doi, who later married another child detainee, Jim Yamaguchi. It drew an ironic picture when Americans were elated in 1992, when Kristi Yamaguchi, the daughter of these Japanese American internment survivors, won the gold medal for the United States in figure skating at the Olympics in Albertville, Norway, outskating Midori Ito—a competitor from Japan (Kule, 2005).

After the Internment

Shortly after the move to the permanent WRA camps commenced, a wave of lawsuits were filed on behalf of the incarcerated (e.g., "Korematsu v. U. S.," 1944; see Mayer, 1995). Although most of such lawsuits proved to be unsuccessful, the WRA quickly became aware of the legal implications of the internment. Some detainees were allowed to exit the camps, under the premise that they relocate out of the West Coast. Subsequently, fearing court decisions challenging the constitutionality of the internment, the government announced in December 1944 that the internment program was to be terminated. In the subsequent 3 months, all detainees were released from the camps. Although Japanese Americans welcomed the regained freedom, resettlement proved to be a challenge for them. Their businesses, farms, and residences had been taken over by new owners, severely vandalized, or terribly neglected. Their communities had been diminished, having lost many of their members. They also faced the reality of racism in their own neighborhoods, enduring housing and employment discrimination. The lives of Japanese Americans, thus, continued to be harsh after the war (Hansen, 1991).

In time, however, Japanese American communities found their ways toward empowerment. Following the civil rights movements, political

awareness began to intensify among the *Sansei*, third-generation Japanese Americans, in the 1970s (Hosokawa, 1969; Sasaki, 1991). This gradually fueled the movement to demand redress for Japanese American internment. The redress movement chronicles the efforts of a wide variety of individuals and organizations, including the *Sansei*, civil rights and community organizations such as Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), and the American government. As Hatamiya (1993) outlines, such efforts consisted of years of community discussions, interviews with the survivors of the internment, protests, and negotiations by individuals and groups across the country. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed a bill to establish the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. The Commission was designed to investigate whether the U.S. government had committed any human rights violations through their relocation programs involving Japanese Americans, and to suggest any applicable remedies if such violations had indeed taken place. The Commission conducted a series of public hearings across the nation, interviewed remaining survivors and their families, and reviewed documents. In 1982, the Commission concluded, in its report titled "Personal Justice Denied," that the internment programs were indeed reflective not of justifiable security considerations but of racism and wartime hysteria created by the government officials (Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, 1982; Hohri, 1988).

The Commission recommended that the surviving internees, approximately 60,000, be granted compensatory payments of \$20,000 each, that a statement of apology be issued by the U.S. government, and that a presidential pardon be granted for the Japanese Americans who were unwarrantedly convicted for violating the curfew and internment orders. In 1988, the redress payments were finally approved by the Congress; in 1990, the first redress payments were made, accompanied by letters of apology. Although these terms did not fully comply with its original

resolution, JACL nevertheless endorsed these recommendations, citing that this marked a major milestone in the lives of Japanese Americans, as it concluded one of the gloomiest episodes in the constitutional history of the United States (Shimabukuro, 2001).

Along the same vein, in the 1980s, civil rights attorneys challenged in the court of law the validity of the court decisions involving the internment. The 1944 case of *Korematsu v. U. S.* mentioned earlier is among such cases. Fred Korematsu was arrested and convicted in 1942 for defying the evacuation order, hoping to join his fiancée, who lived on the East Coast. Korematsu then unsuccessfully appealed his case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and subsequently to the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1944, a conservative Supreme Court upheld the conviction, stating that internment of Japanese Americans was constitutional. It took Korematsu and his supporters 40 years before gaining a sense of redemption. A petition was filed on Korematsu's behalf by a team of attorneys for a *writ of error coram nobis* (i.e., a request to acknowledge gross legal injustice when earlier Supreme Court decisions cannot be reversed), and a Federal District Court decided in their favor in 1984 ("*Korematsu v. U.S.*," 1984; see Blodgett, 1986, for further information). In addition to the redress movement, thus, this landmark victory further reminded us of the unlawful nature of the incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II.

Recent Discrimination Against Japanese Americans: From Blatant to Subtle

As the redress movement was underway, Japanese American communities were facing another challenge: Japan bashing. The trade conflict between Japan and the United States had emerged in the 1970s, reaching its peak in the 1980s. It was marked by the contrast between Japan's growing prosperity and the ailing economy in the United States. This fueled anti-Japanese sentiments, which often led to organized anti-Japanese rallies (Lawrence, 2001). In well-televised

scenes, for example, American workers often destroyed or burned Japanese products in public. Consistent with such an anti-Japanese climate, others committed hate crimes targeting Japanese Americans. A tragic event took place in 1982, when two unemployed Detroit autoworkers murdered a man who they believed was Japanese, in retaliation for their career displacement. The victim, Vincent Chin—a Chinese American—was murdered, reminding people of the pervasive and irrational nature of Japan bashing in the 1980s (Umemoto, 2000).

Similar incidents of discrimination, albeit less blatant, have occurred since then. Kristi Yamaguchi, as discussed earlier, won the gold medal for the United States in figure skating at the 1992 Olympics. In addition to the Olympic gold, Yamaguchi had won virtually every competition she entered in 1991 and 1992, including two consecutive world championships, making her by far the most successful American skater of the period. From Carol Heiss, to Peggy Fleming, to Dorothy Hamill, to Tara Lipinski, white American female Olympic champions in figure skating have historically enjoyed highly visible media exposure (e.g., movie roles and long-term television contracts) and lifelong business endorsements, and Yamaguchi's medal should have been equally valuable (Brennan, 1997). However, such exposure and endorsements escaped Yamaguchi virtually altogether. In fact, in a 1992 article titled "To Marketers, Kristi Yamaguchi Isn't as Good as Gold," *Business Week* ("To Marketers," 1992) reported that many American corporations were admittedly reluctant to feature Yamaguchi in their projects, due to her Japanese heritage and appearance. This shows that discrimination against Japanese Americans can also take subtle forms, such as the absence of incentives and privileges white Americans take for granted.

THE CURRENT TRENDS AND THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE AMERICANS

As discussed so far, many once-prosperous Japanese American enclaves have been dissolving

in recent decades. According to Fugita and Fernandez (2004), while there were approximately 40 Japanese American neighborhoods across several Western states in the early twentieth century, only three such areas remain in California and Hawaii. Although the Japanese American neighborhoods seen throughout the early part of the last century might no longer *physically* exist in their original forms, there is much evidence to suggest that Japanese American communities are far from diminishing.

The socioeconomic profiles of Japanese Americans, as previously discussed, resemble those of white Americans, and they are highly assimilated into the mainstream U.S. culture. In addition to the high levels of educational and occupational achievements among Japanese Americans, the presence of prominent Japanese American political figures provides further evidence for this structural assimilation. Currently, for example, there are three Congresspersons of Japanese descent. Senior U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii, who became the first Japanese American to serve in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1959, is perhaps the best known of the three. In addition, there are Representative Michael Honda, who spent his childhood years in the internment camp in Colorado, and Representative Robert Matsui, who was instrumental in the passing of the legislation approving the redress payments in 1988 (Hatamiya, 1993). Also, former Congressperson Norman Mineta, who currently serves as the Secretary of Transportation, was the first Asian American to serve in the cabinet under the Clinton administration as U.S. Secretary of Commerce. In the judicial realm, Lance Ito, a Los Angeles Superior Court Justice, is well known for having presided over a highly publicized murder case involving a former football star, O. J. Simpson.

In addition to being structurally assimilated, Japanese Americans are also highly amalgamated into the mainstream through intermarriages. As discussed in an earlier section, many Japanese Americans have married individuals of

non-Japanese heritage, mostly white partners—as did Justice Ito—and the majority of Japanese Americans are third- or higher-generation Americans. Given these tendencies of socioeconomic and social assimilation among Japanese Americans in the mainstream society, it is not surprising that, unlike other Asian American groups, Japanese Americans no longer live in ethnic enclaves (Alba & Logan, 1992). What are the implications of such assimilation for Japanese Americans' participation in their ethnic communities?

Research indicates that the high residential integration, socioeconomic mobility, and social assimilation of Japanese Americans have not significantly reduced the level of their involvement in the ethnic community. Fugita and O'Brien (1991) conducted a large-scale study of the ethnic community involvement among second- and third-generation Japanese Americans (i.e., the *Nisei* and *Sansei*, respectively) in California. Their results revealed a consistent trend of involvement among the *Nisei* and the *Sansei* with Japanese-American communities. For example, the *Nisei* respondents in their study were found to belong to two Japanese American voluntary organizations on average, and the *Sansei* respondents belonged to one. Also, both the *Nisei* and the *Sansei* reported having at least one "best friend" that is of Japanese descent. In addition, the results showed that their outmarriage was not necessarily predictive of lower ethnic community involvement. Specifically, about 50% of the outmarried *Nisei* and *Sansei* in their study belonged to at least one Japanese American voluntary organization. Although the number was higher for those who were not outmarried (67%), the ethnic community involvement among the outmarried *Nisei* and *Sansei* is still impressive. Furthermore, it was found that, along many dimensions (e.g., work, family, etc.), the *Nisei* and the *Sansei* reported that their value priorities differed greatly from those held by white Americans. Based on these results, Fugita and O'Brien conclude that Japanese Americans have maintained their active participation in

Japanese-American communities, despite the evidence of assimilation and the vanishing of Japanese-American enclaves (also see Fugita & Fernandez, 2004).

In short, the evidence of Japanese Americans' participation in the mainstream society is only matched by equally strong evidence of their participation in Japanese American communities. Fugita and Fernandez (2004) contend that Japanese Americans find Japanese American social networks not only compatible with but also complementary to their lives in the mainstream society—particularly in facing the social boundaries that continue to separate them from the mainstream society. This observation challenges the commonly held *zero-sum* assumption that assimilation into the mainstream culture implies a detachment from the "other" culture.

Why do Japanese Americans cherish their Japanese roots despite their obvious social and socioeconomic assimilation? There are two plausible explanations. First, Tuan (1999) points out that, unlike white immigrant groups, even third- or fourth-generation Japanese Americans will never be allowed to be fully integrated into the mainstream, no matter how socioeconomically assimilated they might become. According to Tuan, Japanese Americans as a group will remain eternally foreign because of the manner in which race is constructed in the United States. She cites an incident on a radio talk show in 1994, whereby New York Senator Alfonse D'Amato, with a mimicked Asian accent, ridiculed previously mentioned Justice Ito during a prominent criminal trial. Clearly, Senator D'Amato considered this highly respected judge, who is a third-generation Japanese American married to a white woman, to be "a caricatured foreigner he did not respect" (p. 2). In other words, because of their race, Japanese Americans will never be included in the "mainstream circle" in the United States. As Waters (1996) suggests, such social boundaries force feed ethnic identity to people of color and create a greater need for ethnic-community-based support.

Second, Nishi's work (Nishi, 1963, 1995) suggests that Japanese Americans may be propelled to maintain their ties to Japanese American communities because of the focus these individuals frequently place on strong family and community ties. Specifically, Japanese Americans often grow up in families in which strong family and community networks are valued and actively utilized (also see Fugita & O'Brien, 1991). The very nature of this value priority, in turn, tends to expose Japanese Americans to the contexts that foster greater appreciation for and participation in family and community networks. Interestingly, this argument by Nishi is in agreement with Doi's (1986) work, which stresses the critical importance of interdependence in the Japanese society—perhaps reflecting the cultural continuity between Japanese Americans and the Japanese. The explanations by Tuan (1999) and Nishi are both plausible, and they do not negate each other. Furthermore, both are greatly consistent with the findings on the ethnic community participation among Japanese Americans in California by Fugita and O'Brien.

Admittedly, many Japanese Americans are skeptical of the changing realities of their communities and worry, for example, that increasing Japanese American participation in the mainstream American society may dissolve Japanese American communities altogether (see Befu, 2002). However, such concerns appear to be unwarranted, given that assimilated Japanese Americans seem to be actively participating in Japanese American communities, as Fugita and his colleagues' works have shown (Fugita & O'Brien, 1991; Fugita & Fernandez, 2004). Thus, Japanese American community participation should perhaps be conceptualized and practiced in terms solely of individuals' association with, interest in, and commitment to Japanese American communities—with no regard to the degree of their participation in the mainstream society. As such, it is important to embrace an open attitude to welcome individuals who may not fit the traditional definitions of *Japanese American* (e.g., mixed-race people of Japanese descent and

the non-Japanese members of Japanese American families). Additionally, it should be recognized that Japanese American communities can thrive in the physical absence of their own ethnic enclaves, particularly given the rapid advances in communications, technology, and product distribution.

In ensuring the continuing robustness of Japanese American communities, Fugita and Fernandez (2004) suggest that it may be useful for each community organization to reassess its mission. As discussed so far, the overwhelming majority of Japanese Americans are third- or higher-generation Americans, many of whom are multiracial or intermarried and structurally assimilated into the mainstream American society. Thus, there is much variance among Japanese Americans in the roles and responsibilities they assume across contexts. As a result, individuals within Japanese American communities may not necessarily share many urgent daily concerns that call for immediate group cohesion. As such, Fugita and Fernandez suggest that, particularly in today's rapidly changing society, clearly defined purposes to meet the contemporary Japanese American interests may serve as a common thread through which community members can collaborate, explore, and grow, ensuring the long-lasting flourishing of these communities.

As illustrated throughout this chapter, Japanese American communities have experienced marked changes over time in various domains, such as their socioeconomic profiles and population characteristics. Like the ever-evolving definitions of what constitutes *American*, our perception of what *Japanese American* is and what it entails may need to be reinvented, in order to accommodate the changing demands and characteristics of the global society in which Japanese American communities exist.

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PHOTO ESSAY 4 Filipino Americans



Filipino lettuce field laborer, Imperial Valley, California, 1939. Prior to the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, a significant fraction of Filipino migrants in the U.S. performed agricultural labor.

SOURCE: Photograph by Dorothea Lange. Reprinted courtesy of the Library of Congress.



Filipino American Red Cross surgical dressing unit, Washington, DC. Mrs. Conchita Perez and Mrs. Weldon J. Jones, wife of acting high commissioner of Philippines, September, 1944. Filipino women were recruited as nurses during the first half of the twentieth century and continue to be heavily involved in health care occupations in the United States.

SOURCE: Photograph courtesy of the Library of Congress.



The Agcoaili family after a dinner honoring a relative visiting from Lawag, Philippines, 1953.

SOURCE: Photo courtesy of Shades of L.A. Archive, Los Angeles Public Library.

Philippine-American Club of Greater Lansing marches in a parade, Lansing, Michigan, 1995. By 2000, Filipinos were the second-largest foreign-born population in the U.S. (after Mexicans), lived throughout the U.S., and were employed in professional and white-collar occupations.

SOURCE: Photograph by Steve Gold.



Young adult group puts on a birthday celebration for Eva Dime, a recent immigrant from Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, at the Filipino Christian Church in Los Angeles, 1996.

SOURCE: Photo courtesy of Shades of L.A. Archive, Los Angeles Public Library.

