

The Historical Legacy for Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy

No other country in the world is a global power simply by virtue of geography.¹ The growth of Russia from an isolated, backward East Slavic principality into a continental Eurasian empire meant that Russian foreign policy had to engage with many of the world's principal centers of power. A Russian official trying to chart the country's foreign policy in the 18th century, for instance, would have to be concerned simultaneously about the position and actions of the Manchu Empire in China, the Persian and Ottoman Empires (and their respective vassals and subordinate allies), as well as all of the Great Powers in Europe, including Austria, Prussia, France, Britain, Holland, and Sweden.

This geographic reality laid the basis for a Russian tradition of a “multivector” foreign policy, with leaders, at different points, emphasizing the importance of relations with different parts of the world. For instance, during the 17th century, fully half of the departments of the *Posolskii Prikaz*—the Ambassadors' Office—of the Muscovite state dealt with Russia's neighbors to the south and east; in the next century, three out of the four departments of the College of International Affairs (the successor agency in the imperial government) covered different regions of Europe.²

Russian history thus bequeaths to the current government a variety of options in terms of how to frame the country's international orientation. To some extent, the choices open to Russia today are rooted in the legacies of past decisions. While a complete survey of Russian history is beyond the scope of this work,³ we believe the most critical legacies from the pre-Soviet period to be the following:

- The selection of Orthodox Christianity by Grand Prince Vladimir of Kiev (988). When the ruler of Kievan Rus' selected a new state religion for his sprawling East Slavic domain, the choice for Orthodox Christianity—the faith of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire centered at Constantinople—instead of Islam or Roman Catholicism meant that Russia (along with Belarus and Ukraine) would be separate from the larger Islamic world (which stretched from Morocco to the Philippines), but also that Russia would not be a full member of the Romano-Germanic civilization that was to define an emerging Europe. For the most part, Russia would be left out of the historical ages that “made Europe,” as historian John Lukacs observed—the high Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment.⁴

- Alexander Nevsky's choice (1249). When the Mongol forces under Batu Khan ravaged the Russian lands beginning in 1237, they did not raid, devastate, and leave; instead, the principalities of Russia became the westernmost provinces of a vast Asian empire that was centered first in Karakorum, Mongolia, and then in Beijing. At the same time, the lands of northwestern Russia faced invasion from the West from the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights, a German Catholic crusading order bent on converting not only the pagan Balts but also the Orthodox Russians to their faith. Alexander Nevsky, prince first of the city-state of Novgorod but ultimately becoming the Grand Prince of all Russia, chose to resist the invaders from the West but to seek accommodation with the Mongols from the East. His choice—to reject the offers of the Pope in Rome and to submit to the Mongol khans—further deepened Russia's isolation from Europe but also forged links eastward across the vast Eurasian steppes.
- The Conquest of the Khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Sibir (1552, 1556, 1582) under Ivan the Terrible. As the Mongol yoke receded, the principality of Moscow began the process of uniting the northern lands of Rus' into one state—but one that was still primarily defined as an Eastern European, Slavic, and Orthodox Christian realm. The conquest of the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan added the entire watershed of the Volga River to Russia's control—and gave Russia access to the Caspian Sea. The emerging Russian Empire was no longer a small state at the eastern periphery of Europe but a Eurasian realm with significant numbers of non-Russian, non-Christian subjects. The conquest of Sibir started a process of Russian expansion and settlement across Siberia that was to reach the shores of the Pacific Ocean. Through this process of southward and eastward conquest, Russia acquired direct borders with the Ottoman Turkish, Persian, and Chinese empires.
- The Time of Troubles (1605–1612) reinforced the suspicion of the West that had been engendered by Nevsky's choice. As the Russian state collapsed, significant portions of its territory were occupied by Poland and Sweden, and Polish forces briefly captured Moscow itself. At the same time, these foreign interventions exposed the fundamental technological, military, and economic weaknesses of the Russian state vis-à-vis the more developed countries of Europe. How Russia could “catch up” while preserving its independence became a critical theme of Russian foreign policy objectives.
- The Treaty of Pereiaslav (1654). This agreement, reached between the Cossacks of Ukraine and the Russian tsar, saw the expansion of Russian power back to the heartland of the old Rus' state, Kiev. It marked the first

stages of the disintegration of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth as the premier power of eastern Europe (culminating in the partitions of Poland during the 18th century) and the ability of Russia to project its power into central Europe. It also was to have lasting cultural impacts: Because Ukraine at this point was far more Westernized, the arrival in Russia of Ukrainian priests and scholars accelerated the process of Westernization in Russia itself.

- The Treaty of Nystad (1721). The gradual Westernization of Russia that had been promoted by Tsar Alexis (1645–1676) was overturned in favor of rapid (and sometimes forcible) change of Russian society and its institutions by his son, Peter, especially along German and Scandinavian models. Peter’s desire to open a “window onto Europe” led to efforts to obtain ports on the Black and Baltic seas. The defeat of Sweden by a modernized Russian army and navy in the Great Northern War saw the cession of the Baltic states to the Russian Empire (adding another large non-Russian, non-Orthodox population), the creation of a new European-style capital, St. Petersburg, to replace Moscow, and Russia’s emergence as one of Europe’s great powers and a full member of the European state system. The Westernization of Russia continued under Peter’s successors, especially Catherine the Great (reigned 1762–1796), who pushed Russia’s frontiers westward and southward. Russia ceased to be on the periphery of Europe. Moreover, Russian armies ranged across Europe; both Berlin (1763) and Paris (1814) were to be occupied by Russian forces. This experience set down the precedent that no fundamental question of European security ought to be settled without Russian participation.
- Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774). This agreement, which terminated a major conflict between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, is significant because it cleared the way for the establishment of Russian power in the Black Sea basin, guaranteed access for Russian merchant vessels into the eastern Mediterranean sea, and gave Russia the right to intercede on behalf of the Ottoman Empire’s Eastern Christian populations in the Balkans and the Near East. This initiated Russia’s modern-day vector toward the Middle East.
- The Capture of Tashkent (1865). The fall of this vital Central Asian city marked Russia’s aggressive advance into Central Asia and its emergence on the doorstep of South Asia. When combined with the founding of the Pacific port city of Vladivostok (1859), on lands ceded to Russia from China as a result of the Treaty of Aigun, it marked the determination of Russia to establish itself as one of the premier powers of Asia.

Because of the simultaneous expansion and activity of Russia in different regions of the world, the Russian government could never focus on one area to the exclusion of others. And while popular versions of history depict tsarist Russia as an autocracy, with policy determined by an all-powerful tsar and implemented faithfully by his servants, the reality was quite different. Medieval Russia had a grand prince who in theory was styled an autocrat, but in reality “was essentially a referee among traditionally powerful boyar clans”—each pursuing different interests and objectives.⁵ Muscovite Russia during the 16th and 17th centuries developed a more effective central governing administration grounded in what was termed the *prikaz* (department) system.⁶ *Prikazy* were created, sometimes on an ad hoc basis, to deal with different aspects of the government’s business.⁷ As a problem or issue would arise, it would be assigned to a *prikaz*, but oftentimes different aspects of the same problem would be under the jurisdiction of different *prikazy*. Therefore, “bureaucratic growth was not linear; new *prikazy* would come into existence, be removed, and responsibilities shifted to other offices.”⁸ It also meant that policy might be the joint responsibility of several *prikazy*.⁹ During the reign of Ivan IV (“the Terrible”), the Russian state was divided into two entities: the *zemshchina* and the *oprichnina*; some *prikazy* were in charge of affairs in both sections, others were established for one or the other, and when new administrative reforms were enacted, new *prikazy* might be set up to implement them¹⁰—all of this adding to the potential bureaucratic confusion.

The famous Russian historian V. O. Kliuchevskiy, in assessing the *prikaz* system, concluded:

As the needs and functions of the state increased in complexity, the number of departments mounted to about fifty. It is hard to discover any system in them. Rather they were a mass of big and small institutions, ministries, offices and temporary commissions, as we would call them now. The great number of departments and the haphazard assignment of the kind of affairs they dealt with made it difficult to control and direct their work. At times the government itself did not know to which of them some unusual case should be referred, and without further deliberation created a new department for the purpose.¹¹

While there was an “Ambassadors’ Office” (*posolskii prikaz*) that functioned as a Foreign Office in Muscovy, this department did not have sole and unchallenged responsibility for handling Russian foreign affairs during this period; instead, policy was divided among overlapping *prikazy*, including the “Secret Office.” This was the department charged with handling the tsar’s private affairs, which, among other things, comprised the monarch’s charitable donations, his falcons, the salt

and fishing industries, and diplomatic correspondence.¹² Responsibilities were shared out for policy among a series of different offices, usually connected to different leading families and factions within the tsar's court, and with no guarantees of coordination.¹³ One *prikaz* might adopt a particular policy course and find that another would block implementation or be pursuing a contradictory course of action; until the tsar or a chief minister intervened, the result might be policy deadlock. In addition, 17th-century Russia experienced two periods of diarchy, when Patriarchs Filaret and Nikon were recognized alongside tsars Michael and Alexis as "great sovereigns," had their own staffs and bureaucracies alongside those of the tsar, and played leading roles in domestic and foreign policy.¹⁴ The growth of *prikazy* during the 17th century led to greater policy confusion, although the overlapping mandates of different offices also enabled a rudimentary system of checks and balances to emerge.¹⁵

Peter the Great abolished both the patriarchate and the *prikazy* and attempted to rationalize the Russian bureaucracy, in part to create a more streamlined and efficient government that would attempt to more closely conform to his views on autocratic government.¹⁶ But the *prikaz* model continued as different factions within the tsarist Russian bureaucracy continued to promote different foreign policies. Eugene Schuyler, an American diplomat posted to Russia in the 19th century, observed:

Each minister being independent and responsible only to the Emperor, there . . . can be no united policy. The councils of ministers do not so much discuss questions of policy as questions of detail, the solution of which depends on two or three ministers jointly. . . it is possible for a measure to be put into operation although it may be contrary to the ideas and desires of the Foreign Office.¹⁷

The lack of any overarching mechanism for coordinating Russian foreign policy was complicated by the development of different philosophical "schools" about where Russia belonged in the world. Two of the most famous were the 19th-century camps of the "Westernizers" (*zapadniki*) and the "Slavophiles." The Westernizers argued that Russia was part of Western civilization and that the goal of Russian foreign policy ought to be complete integration with Europe and that any divergence between Russia and other Western countries ought to be corrected in favor of prevailing Western models so as to bring Russia into harmony with the rest of the Western world. The Slavophiles tended to see Russia as separate from other European nations, a "Slavic-Byzantine" civilization that defined Eastern Europe in contrast to the "Romano-Germanic" one that defined the nations of the West. In foreign policy, they tended to support the establishment of a distinct Russian zone

rather than complete and total integration into the West.¹⁸ In the 21st century, their heirs are those who argue for Russia to pursue an “alliance” relationship with the United States and a U.S.-led European bloc (sometimes referred to in the contemporary discussions as the “Atlanticists”) and those who see “European civilization” as having three branches, of which Russia-Eurasia is one, meaning that Russia should not subordinate its policies to “join” the West but instead structure relations between the United States, Europe, and Russia on the basis of equality.¹⁹

The Russian advance toward the Middle East, South Asia, and the Far East, however, engendered the rise of a different perspective, one that eventually coalesced around what became known as the Eurasian school. If the Westernizers saw Russia as Western and the Slavophiles viewed Russia as a distinct European civilization, the Eurasianists defined Russia as a primarily Asian actor. Prince Esper Ukhtomsky, who accompanied the future tsar Nicholas II on a grand tour of Asia in 1890–1891, wrote:

The bonds that unite our part of Europe with Iran and Turan [a term indicating the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Asia Minor], and through them with India and the Celestial Empire [China], are so ancient and lasting that, as yet, we ourselves, as a nation and a state, do not fully comprehend their full meaning and the duties they entail on us, both in our home and foreign policy.²⁰

By the dawn of the 20th century, there was quite a robust foreign policy debate in the Russian Empire—and different perspectives were endorsed by different ministries. Should Russia concentrate on shoring up its position in Europe—and should this be done through an alliance with France or by reaching a new accommodation with a rising Germany? Should Russia extend and consolidate its hold on new territories in Central and East Asia? Was the time propitious for further advances southward at the expense of the Ottoman and Persian Empires? The ministers of War (Alexei Kuropatkin, served 1898–1904), Foreign Affairs (Vladimir Lamsdorff, served 1900–1906), and Finance (Sergei Witte, served 1892–1903) espoused radically different policies. The inability to commit to a single, overarching policy proved to be disastrous for the Russian Empire. Resources were overcommitted and bureaucratic politics on the *prikaz* model meant that Russia was not ready for the inevitable conflicts that would break out in Asia (the Russo-Japanese war, 1904–1905) and Europe (World War I, 1914–1918).²¹

Today, the Russian Foreign Ministry, in particular, attempts to examine the legacies of Russia’s past foreign policies and in particular the work of diplomats such as Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin (1605–1681), the advisors of Catherine the

Great, Prince Alexander Gorchakov (1798–1883), Alexander Izvolsky (1856–1919), and Sergei Sazonov (1861–1927) in shaping thinking about future foreign policy issues.²²

THE SOVIET LEGACY

The Russian Empire was overthrown in 1917 by a group of revolutionary Marxists who proceeded to establish the world's first state ostensibly governed on the basis of “scientific socialism.” Initially, Vladimir Lenin and his associates expected the imminent spread of revolution around the world in the wake of the devastation caused by the First World War. The new Soviet government proclaimed its desire for a “just and democratic peace” that would be without annexations, incorporations, or indemnities, in the words of the November 1917 decree on peace.²³ In so doing, the new regime expressed its desire to help spread the revolution throughout the world—not only in the advanced industrial nations of Europe but throughout the colonial world as well.

When the world revolution failed to materialize, the Soviet state was limited largely to the territories of the old Russian Empire. The proclamation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922—uniting Soviet Russia with other republics created on the territory of the old Russian Empire—was supposed to be a “decisive step toward uniting the workers of all countries into one World Socialist Soviet Republic,” as the preamble to the new constitution stated. But the USSR was constantly torn between its ideological commitment to spreading the Soviet system throughout the world and the needs of safeguarding its national interests. The rapid (but, in human terms, costly) industrialization of the Soviet Union and the ultimate victory in the Second World War transformed the USSR from a regional power into an emerging superpower with global reach.

Under Josef Stalin, the USSR was guided by what Vladislav Zubok has labeled a “revolutionary-imperial paradigm,” meaning that the Soviet state drew upon the geopolitical strategies of its tsarist predecessor but was also securing for itself the ability to spread the Soviet system around the world under Moscow's leading role.²⁴ Lenin's interpretation of Marxist thought had given preeminence to the “leading role” of a revolutionary party in accelerating the process by which a country might arrive at socialism; in terms of foreign policy, it meant that the Soviet Union was intended to play this role for the world as a whole. The legitimacy of the Soviet system, therefore, was connected with its ability to defend and spread the revolution. Stalin made this perfectly clear when he declared, “Whoever occupies a territory also imposes his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.”²⁵ This committed the Soviet state to a direct confrontation with the United States,

leading to the Cold War. It also meant greater involvement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the Russian state previously had few strategic interests. Stalin's successors—Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and even Mikhail Gorbachev at the beginning of his tenure—were all constrained by this paradigm (even if Khrushchev scaled back Stalin's emphasis on military means to spread the Soviet system when he acknowledged that the victory of Soviet-style socialism did not have to be achieved "through armed interference by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of capitalist countries").²⁶

In particular, Brezhnev committed the Soviet state to changing the "correlation of forces" by diverting economic resources to achieving strategic parity with the United States and ultimate recognition in 1972 from Washington of its co-equal superpower status. But Moscow's global ambitions rested on a stagnating economic system that could only generate a fraction of the resources available to the United States. So the Soviet leadership, in contrast to the People's Republic of China, which successfully de-ideologized its foreign policy over time, remained committed to achieving ideological goals that drained the Soviet Union and helped to precipitate its demise. Moreover, the Soviet system was not immune to the bureaucratic divisions and rivalries that had plagued tsarist Russia. There were regular clashes over policy, especially between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and between the Soviet government and the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.²⁷

Brezhnev's immediate successors—Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko—because of their age and limited tenure as Soviet leaders, did not fundamentally alter the course and direction of Soviet foreign policy. Not until the elevation of a younger and more dynamic figure as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—Mikhail Gorbachev—in 1985 would there be any dramatic change in Soviet foreign policy.

As Gorbachev continued in office, particularly after the 1987 Central Committee Plenum that marked the acceleration of his reform efforts, he attempted to break out of the Stalinist "revolutionary-imperial paradigm" in favor of his "new thinking"—a redefinition of the Soviet role in the world that de-emphasized confrontation in favor of cooperation with the United States to achieve security.²⁸ Gorbachev also endorsed the primacy of Europe as the principal vector for Moscow's foreign policy (the "common European home"), declaring in Prague in April 1987: "We assign an overriding significance to the European course of our foreign policy."

Gorbachev's most significant achievement, however, was, in the words of his former aide Anatoli Cherniaev, his "de-ideologization" of Soviet foreign policy, which "made possible such historic events as the unification of Germany, the democratization of Eastern Europe, and the creation of a new transatlantic

TABLE 1.1
Soviet Leaders, 1922–1991

Paramount Leader	Formal Position	Dynamics of His Tenure
Vladimir Lenin (1922–1924)	Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (1922–1924), effective head of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks).	Had served as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Republic from 1918 until the creation of the USSR. From 1922, Josef Stalin served as General Secretary of the Party.
Josef Stalin (1924–1953) (NOTE: Stalin shared power within the Communist Party, first with Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev from 1924 until 1927 and then with Nikolai Bukharin until 1929.)	General Secretary of the Communist Party from 1922; became chairman of the government in 1941 and generalissimo of the Soviet Union.	Alexei Rykov served as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars from 1924 until 1930; Vyacheslav Molotov succeeded him until 1941. While this was ostensibly the highest government post, Stalin's control of the Party made him paramount leader of the USSR.
Georgy Malenkov (1953–1955)	Chairman of the Council of Ministers.	Malenkov was seen initially as the strongest figure after Stalin's death, but he soon found himself sharing power with Nikita Khrushchev, who became General Secretary of the Communist Party.
Nikita Khrushchev (1953–1964)	General Secretary of the Communist Party; gradually became the paramount leader after pushing out rivals in 1955 and 1957; became Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1958.	From 1955 until 1958, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers was Nikolai Bulganin. Khrushchev fired him in 1958 so as to be head of both the party and the government.
Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982)	Succeeded Khrushchev as General Secretary after the former was ousted in 1964. In 1977, he became chairman of the Soviet parliament (Supreme Soviet) and as such was seen as the effective head of the government.	From 1964 until 1980, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers was Alexei Kosygin, who replaced Khrushchev and who initially shared power with Brezhnev but was gradually marginalized. He was replaced by Nikolai Tikhonov, who held this position until 1985.

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Paramount Leader	Formal Position	Dynamics of His Tenure
Yuri Andropov (1982–1984)	Became both the General Secretary of the Communist Party and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet.	
Konstantin Chernenko (1984–1985)	Became both General Secretary and chairman of the Supreme Soviet.	
Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–1991)	Became General Secretary in 1985 and in 1988 became the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. In 1990, he created a new office, that of President of the USSR, and became the first president.	From 1985 until 1988, the head of state was technically Andrei Gromyko, who served as chairman of the Supreme Soviet; in 1988, Gorbachev took this position. With the creation of the presidency in 1990, Gorbachev attempted to transfer many of the powers traditionally held by the General Secretary of the CPSU to this office.

Source: Compiled by authors.

partnership.”²⁹ De-ideologization rejected any idea of an eventual collapse of the Western system and was intended to release the Soviet system from committing most of its resources to preparing for a confrontation with the Western world, principally the United States. By the latter half of his tenure as General Secretary, Gorbachev had taken steps to end Soviet involvement in regional conflicts in Africa, Latin America, and Asia and set the stage for major improvements in previously chilly relationships with key powers, starting with the United States but also including China, Great Britain, France, and West Germany.

Gorbachev’s efforts to reduce foreign tensions, however, could not rescue the Soviet system from its deep domestic crises, particularly the failure of the economy. The Soviet Union began to dissolve, in part because the leaders of the Russian Federation—the main core of the USSR—believed that the Soviet system had drained away the resources and vitality of Russia in the service of Communist ideology.³⁰ When the coup attempt launched by hardliners in August 1991 to prevent the signing of a new Union Treaty that would have replaced the Soviet Union with a far looser confederation failed, Russian president Boris Yeltsin took the step, with his Ukrainian and Belarusian colleagues, of formally dissolving the USSR in December 1991.

The collapse of the USSR in 1991 freed Russian foreign policy from any ideological constraints that had shackled Soviet policymakers, particularly the need to pursue foreign policies designed to shore up the domestic legitimacy of the Soviet system. However, as former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has noted, one legacy of the Soviet past has been a “superpower mentality” by which Russia attempted to continue to “participate in any and all significant international developments, often incurring a greater domestic cost than the country could bear.”³¹ On the other hand, as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has observed, Russia also inherited Soviet-era legacies in terms of relations with many nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America—military relationships, economic ties, and so on—that continue to shape post-Soviet Russia’s foreign policy.³²

In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the new Russian government had to try and formulate policies when “the country has yet to recognize itself as a state . . . [and] does not have a sensible and formulated system of national interests on which foreign policy might be built,” as Sergei Stankevich, who served as Boris Yeltsin’s state counselor for policy issues, put it.³³ Initially, it appeared that the new Russian government was “keen to project an image to the West and the world at large that it was following a different policy than the one followed by the Soviet Union.”³⁴ Over time, the Yeltsin administration attempted to determine which Soviet-era policies might still be beneficial for a post-Soviet Russia while also continuing Gorbachev’s efforts at greater integration into the West.

Twice in the 20th century, Russian leaders attempted to reset their country’s foreign policy, and both times—after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991—had to come to terms with Russia’s historic legacies affecting their foreign policy choices. Boris Yeltsin summed up the challenge as follows:

Russia’s difficult transitional state does not allow us yet to discern its new or permanent character, nor does it allow us to obtain clear answers to the questions, “What are we turning away from? What do we wish to save?” and “Which elements do we wish to resurrect and which do we wish to create anew?”³⁵

In the first two decades after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy could very well be described as “post-Soviet”: dealing with the consequences of the collapse and attempting to salvage the benefits of the Soviet state while charting a new direction. Today, this process is largely complete, and the formative period of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy has come to an end.³⁶

NOTES

1. As per the commentary of Alexei Pushkov. Cf. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "After the G-8: Putin, at least, got what we wanted," *International Herald Tribune*, July 18, 2006, at <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/17/opinion/edgvosdev.php>.
2. V. V. Pokhlebkina, *Vneshnaia Politika Rusi, Rossii I SSSR za 1000 let* (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1992), 179–180.
3. We recommend, for a survey of Russian history, Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 6th edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
4. John Lukacs, Mark G. Malvasi, and Jeffrey O. Nelson, *Remembered Past: John Lukacs on History, Historians, and Historical Knowledge: A Reader* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2005), 434.
5. Paul Bushkovitch, *Religion and Society in Russia: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 33.
6. For a short overview of the *prikazy*, see the relevant entry in the *Slavianskaia Entsiklopediia: Kievskaia Rus'-Moskovskaia*, Volume II (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2002), 201–202.
7. George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, 5th revised edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961), 142–143; Walter G. Moss, *A History of Russia, Volume I, To 1917*, 2nd edition (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 174.
8. Matthew Paul Romaniello, *Absolutism and Empire: Governance on Russia's Early-Modern Frontier*, PhD Dissertation, Ohio State University, 2003, 47.
9. As was the case with military policy, before efforts were made to centralize the command structure. See Natalya Shepova, "Military Leader-Diplomat. Duke Vasily Golitsyn, Great Guardian of Russia's State Affairs," *Voennyi Diplomat* 5 (2004): 90.
10. See A. Zimin, "P. A. Sadikov's Studies in the History of the Oprichnina," *Voprosy Istorii* 12 (December 1950): 144–148, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 13, no. 3 (May 12, 1951), 7–9.
11. V. O. Kluichevsky, *A Course in Russian History: The Seventeenth Century*, ed. Alfred J. Rieber, trans. Natalie Duddington (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), 164.
12. *Ibid.*, 165–66.
13. John P. LeDonne, *Absolutism and Ruling Class: The Formation of the Russian Political Order, 1700–1825* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 64.
14. Vernadsky, 142.
15. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 4th edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 191–92.
16. Moss, 238.
17. Eugene Schuyler, *Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja*, Volume II (New York: Scribner, Armstrong and Co., 1876), 263.
18. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "Russia: European but not Western?" *Orbis* 51, no. 1 (Winter 2007), esp. 130–132; in turn, this sketch draws on the work of S. V. Utechin, *Russian Political Thought: A Concise History* (New York: Praeger, 1964).
19. Igor S. Ivanov, *The New Russian Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center and Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 12; see also the transcript of Sergei Lavrov's remarks to

the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on September 24, 2008, at http://www.cfr.org/publication/17384/conversation_with_serгей_lavrov.html.

20. Quoted in Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, *Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia* (Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 1999), 243.

21. See especially William C. Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), esp. 328–393.

22. Ivanov, 26–32.

23. Cited in Victor S. Mamatey, *Soviet Russian Imperialism* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1964), 113–115.

24. Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

25. Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), 114.

26. See Krushchev's report to the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, in *Current Soviet Policies II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath*, ed. Leo Gruliov (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), 37.

27. This was certainly the view of U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger (cf. Schapiro, 41), and the rivalry is attested to by Soviet defector Arkady N. Shevchenko; see his *Breaking with Moscow* (London: Grafton, 1986), esp. 310–311.

28. See, for instance, David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," *Foreign Affairs* (America and the World 1988 edition) 68, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 66–81.

29. Anatoli Chernaiev, "Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: The Concept," in *Turning Points in Ending the Cold War*, ed. Kiron K. Skinner (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2007), 112.

30. "Yeltsin To Seek Russian Sovereignty as Part of New Soviet Union," *Associated Press*, May 30, 1990, at <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1990/Yeltsin-To-Seek-Russian-Sovereignty-as-Part-of-New-Soviet-Union/id-ed65a51284d1b351341d853a53dc4992>.

31. Ivanov, 13–14.

32. See, for instance, Foreign Minister Lavrov's remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit. on the importance of contemporary Russia building on these pre-existing ties and legacies as part of its return as a global power.

33. Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," in *Russia in the National Interest*, ed. Nikolas K. Gvosdev (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 2003), 19.

34. Jyotsna Bakshi, "Russian Policy towards South Asia," *Strategic Analysis* 23, no. 8 (November 1999): 1375.

35. Quoted in Ivanov, 11.

36. See the comments of former Foreign Minister Ivanov, who argues that this process of consolidation was coming to a close during the Putin administration. Ivanov, 8.